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## Viewing cable 09BOGOTA688, URIBE RESTRICTS DAS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09BOGOTA688**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">09BOGOTA688</a>	<a href="#">2009-03-02 15:54</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">SECRET</a>	<a href="#">Embassy Bogota</a>

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks>

VZCZCXYZ0001  
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #0688/01 0611554  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 021554Z MAR 09  
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7456  
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8687  
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1738  
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR 9961  
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 7059  
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 7779  
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0566  
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T BOGOTA 000688

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2029

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [PHUM](#) [KJUS](#) [CO](#)

SUBJECT: URIBE RESTRICTS DAS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN

## REACTION TO EAVESDROPPING SCANDAL

REF: A. 09 BOGOTA 569

1B. 08 BOGOTA 003359

1C. 08 BOGOTA 003193

1D. 08 BOGOTA 3359

Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer  
Reasons 1.4 (b and d)

### SUMMARY

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11. (C) President Uribe stripped authority from the Department of Administrative Security (DAS) to conduct wiretaps after press revelations that the DAS had illegally spied on domestic political figures. All DAS monitoring must now be done under the control of the Colombian National Police (CNP). Uribe faced public pressure to make changes to the agency, which has been involved in repeated political spying scandals. The Supreme Court, which has been subject to DAS surveillance, called for international organizations to investigate, and reportedly filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). The Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) continues to investigate, and has entered a DAS listening facility run in cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). DEA has cooperated with GOC authorities. End summary.

### URIBE WEAKENS DAS WITHOUT ABOLISHING IT

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12. (U) President Alvaro Uribe announced on February 26 that he had prohibited the Department of Administrative Security (DAS) from conducting wiretaps after leading news magazine "Semana" revealed that the DAS (roughly an FBI equivalent) had illegally spied on a wide range of domestic political figures (reftel A). At an early morning press conference, Uribe announced that all legal wiretaps will have to be approved judicially and by the Prosecutor General (Fiscalia) and will be implemented by personnel of Colombian National Police (CNP). The DAS reports to the Presidency.

13. (U) Recognizing the technical nature of the work, Uribe stressed that DAS teams will continue to work the intercepts, but that they will be under CNP control. Uribe was explicit that DAS director Felipe Munoz would have to report to CNP chief General Oscar Naranjo for all wiretap operations. DAS intelligence chief Fernando Tabarez resigned on February 26, and three others, including intelligence deputy Jorge Lagos, have also resigned as a result of the scandal. The CNP was involved in its own wiretapping scandal in May, 2007, which led to the dismissal of twelve CNP generals and the appointment of Naranjo as CNP head.

14. (U) Uribe faced pressure to make changes to DAS in the wake of the scandal, which is only the latest in a series of domestic spying scandals involving the embattled agency. Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos told reporters in Washington that DAS was a "sick patient" that perhaps needed a "Christian burial," but that Uribe would decide its future. Prosecutor General (Fiscal) Mario Iguaran said he was considering ordering all DAS listening facilities to be temporarily closed, but he held off on the move following Uribe's order. Still, Supreme Court President Francisco Ricaurte--one of the many reported targets of the illegal monitoring--said Uribe's changes would do little to address the underlying problems at the DAS because it would not identify those who ordered the illicit spying.

### RESPONSIBILITY FOR ILLEGAL WIRETAPS STILL UNCLEAR

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15. (U) The Fiscalia continued its investigation into who was behind the illegal wiretapping and the subsequent attempt to destroy evidence (reftel A). Investigators from CTI, the Fiscalia's investigative unit, have collected over 10,000 records and are interviewing DAS personnel. After Fiscalia complaints that the DAS was not cooperating in the investigations, DAS Director Munoz assured Iguaran that the DAS would fully cooperate. The DAS did not initially permit

CTI investigators into facilities operated jointly with other countries, including one run by DEA.

#### USG FULLY COOPERATING

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¶6. (S) DEA officials confirmed that Colombian investigators entered a DAS facility that had been operated jointly with DEA, and that DEA has cooperated fully in the probe. Inspector General (Procuraduria) investigators entered on February 23, where they reviewed evidence and interviewed DAS officials. Those investigators lacked the technical expertise to analyze their findings. CTI technical investigators joined the investigation the following day. DEA and DAS officials helped the CTI investigators gather data on all lines monitored at the facility so CTI could establish that proper judicial orders existed for each number. DEA officials confirmed that all operations were carried out with proper orders (reftel A). DEA and DAS personnel explained that, contrary to press accounts, it was physically impossible to independently target telephone lines from the site.

#### GOC DENIES INVOLVEMENT

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¶7. (C) Senior Presidential adviser Jose Obdulio Gaviria continued to deny involvement, but both CNP Chief Naranjo and former DAS Director Andres Penate have separately told us that Gaviria in the past has pushed DAS to spy on the GOC's political opponents. Supreme Court President Ricaurte and Senator Petro both publicly accused the Casa de Narino of ordering the wiretaps. Gaviria said he was an "enemy" of both illegal recordings and their publication, which he said differentiated him from "Semana" editor Alejandro Santos, who had published details. Former President Cesar Gaviria publicly speculated that a Colombian "Montesinos" might be behind the illegal intercepts.

¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that former DAS subdirector Jose Manuel Narvaez--a "paramilitary advisor" who left DAS in 2005 after a previous scandal--had retained access to the agency after his departure and was the Casa de Narino's main liaison with DAS. XXXXXXXXXXXX alleged that Narvaez's Casa de Narino contact was probably Gaviria or Secretary of the Presidency Bernardo Moreno. In addition, XXXXXXXXXXXX said mid-level DAS operators had initiated illegal wiretaps themselves, both to earn money and as insurance against their political masters. He claimed the Semana revelations were sourced to DAS personnel who were disgruntled with Lagos' and Tabarez' manipulation of the polygraph system to punish enemies and collect kickbacks for promotions.

¶9. (C) DAS Director Munoz told the press on February 26th that computer records pertaining to possible illegal recordings of DAS targets' conversations with Embassy personnel may have been discovered, adding that he would share any results with us. XXXXXXXXXXXX also told us the DAS had listened to U.S. officials via conversations with Vice Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo, among others. He said Jaramillo was targeted by Casa de Narino and military officials concerned about his role in promoting human rights investigations within the Armed Forces.

#### COURT ADAMANT FOR STRONGER STEPS

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¶10. (C) Colombia's Supreme Court called for international involvement to investigate the situation, and its 23 members met with Iguaran, Inspector General (Procurador) Ordonez, and Munoz to complain about having been targeted. Supreme Court President Ricaurte publicly alleged a GOC "plot" against the Court, and told the press the DAS surveillance undermined its independence. The Supreme Court reportedly filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and also informed the Special UN Rapporteur on Judicial Independence Leandro Despouy. The Court took previous allegations of executive encroachment to the UN (reftel D), suggesting the long-smoldering conflict between Uribe and

Court may soon reignite.

¶11. (C) Ivan Velazquez, the Court's lead in the parapolitical investigation (and both a frequent target and critic of Uribe - see reftel C), told us on February 20 that the DAS surveillance, including interception of his communications, was intended to discourage witnesses from cooperating with his investigations. He also told Spanish

daily "El Pais" that DAS had recorded over 2,000 hours of his telephone conversations.

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